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The Proposed Court-Appointed
Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a
Constitutional Justification
The Watergate episode' brought to public consciousness the chal-
lenging question of how to limit executive control over prosecutions of
executive officials without transgressing constitutional limits.2 Al-
though the Constitution does not speak specifically to this problem, it
is clear on at least two points. First, it vests the executive, not the legis-
lature or the judiciary, with the power to enforce the law.3 Second, the
provision for impeachment 4 establishes the fundamental concept that
the executive must be accountable to the public.5 The tension between
these two principles is unavoidable: unless there are some limits to
executive control of the mechanisms for law enforcement, the concept
of accountability could be circumvented by a corrupt executive intent
1. On June 17, 1972, agents of the Committee to Re-Elect the President were arrested
while they were burglarizing the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the
Watergate office complex. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 4 (1975).
The term "Watergate" refers to a "conglomerate of various illegal and unethical activities
in which various officers and employees of the Nixon Reelection Committee and various
White House aides of President Nixon" sought to destroy the integrity of the political
process and to obstruct justice. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
ACTIVITIES, THE SENATE WATERGATE REPORT 8 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
2. See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1977, at 1, col. 2. See generally Note, Removing Politics
from the Justice Department: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50
N.Y.U.L. REv. 366 (1975). The potential for conflict of interest inherent in the executive,
because of its status as a branch of government with final authority for enforcing the
law, long antedates the Nixon administration. See, e.g., Watergate Reorganization and
Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 183 (1975-1976) (Memorandum on "Historical
Incidents Where a Division of Government Crimes or a Temporary Special Prosecutor
Would Have Been Helpful"); C. WOODwARD, RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO CHARGES OF
MISCONDUCT 178 (1974) (politically sensitive prosecution of corruption in Post Office De-
partment ordered by President Garfield despite warning from Attorney General that in-
vestigation would be politically damaging); Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself,
65 CALIF. L. REv. 597-611 (1977) (case studies of executive responses to conflicts of
interest).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cI. I.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
5. The founding fathers, acquainted with the English history of impeachment as a
means of controlling corrupt Crown officers, considered the impeachment process a way
of dealing with corruption and misconduct by high federal officeholders. The cumbersome
impeachment process, perhaps appropriate for the 18th century, cannot serve as a mean-
ingful check on corruption that may exist in the vast layers of government below the
President. Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and
S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the




upon obstructing the machinery of justice and the operation of the
political process. The task for legislators who seek to ensure that the
executive branch will not escape the reach of the law is to pinpoint the
limits of the executive's power to thwart prosecutions against itself-a
task that, because of the absence of explicit constitutional provisions,
requires striking a proper balance between the executive responsibility
to enforce the law and the need to ensftre that the law will be enforced
against the executive itself.
Among the efforts to strike such a balance has been a flurry of
legislative proposals for the creation of an independent office of special
prosecutor authorized to investigate and prosecute executive wrong-
doing.0 The most recent attempt is S. 555,7 which provides a mechanism
for the appointment of independent temporary special prosecutors, at
the request of the Attorney General,s by a panel of five judges9 who
would comprise a division of the United States Court of Appeals for
6. See, e.g., S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S12,112 (daily ed. July 21, 1976).
This bill would have established within the Department of Justice an independent Office
of Special Prosecutor headed by a Special Prosecutor appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Special Prosecutor would have been appointed for
a three-year term and would have been removable by the President only for extraordinary
improprieties. The bill was passed with amendments by the Senate, id., but it died in the
House. 35 CoNo. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1362 (1977).
For a summary of various proposals for court appointment of a single special prosecutor,
see Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Com. on the Judiciary, pt. 1, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1973) (memorandum of law of Sen. Taft) [hereinafter cited as
1973 Hearings].
7. Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, S. 555, tit. I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REC. S10,774-77 (daily ed. June 27, 1977). See generally S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) (report accompanying S. 555). Section 101(a) of S. 555 would amend title
28 of the United States Code by adding "Chapter 39.-Special Prosecutor," which would
contain §§ 591-598 of the present bill. Section 102(a) would amend Chapter 3 of title 28 of
the United States Code by adding " 49. Assignment of judges to divisions to appoint
special prosecutors." Hereinafter citations to S. 555 will be to the subsections of the
proposed §§ 49 and 591-598, which are printed in the bill.
S. 555, as amended, was passed by the Senate on June 27, 1977, by a vote of 74-5. 123
CONG. REC. S10,774 (daily ed. June 27, 1977). The House version of the special prosecutor
legislation, Special Prosecutor Act of 1977, H.R. 9705, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), was
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on June 19, 1977. 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1667 (1978).
8. S. 555, § 592(c)(1).
9. Section 49(a) of S. 555 provides that five judges. or Justices be assigned every two
years to a division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as
a special panel for appointing temporary special prosecutors when needed. Section 49(d)
authorizes the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to request that the Chief Justice of the United States designate and assign five
federal court of appeals judges or Supreme Court Justices, one of whom would be a judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to the special panel. In
assigning judges or Justices to sit on this panel, priority would be given to senior retired
judges and senior retired Justices. Id. § 49(c). No more than one judge or Justice from a
particular court could be named to the panel. Id. § 49(d). The legislation prohibits
judges serving on the panel from sitting in any case brought by the special prosecutor. Id.
§ 49(o.
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the District of Columbia. 10 The bill's scheme would endow the At-
torney General with wide discretion to determine whether to ask for
appointment of the special prosecutor;" after appointment, however,
the Attorney General would exert no control except for a limited
power to remove the special prosecutor for "extraordinary impro-
prieties."'1 The Attorney General would apply to the panel'3 for ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor to investigate alleged federal crimes
14
involving the President, the Vice President, a cabinet officer, or other
specified individuals.1 He would also have to apply to the judicial
panel for appointment of a temporary special prosecutor whenever he
determined that the continuation of an investigation or the outcome
of a prosecution "may directly and substantially affect the partisan
political or personal interests of the President, the Attorney General,
or the interests of the President's political party."' 6 If the panel dis-
agreed with the Attorney General's judgment that such a conflict or
appearance of conflict did not exist, it would be required to appoint a
special prosecutor.' 7 A temporary special prosecutor appointed by the
judicial panel would be authorized to exercise all investigative and
prosecutorial powers vested in the Department of Justice and the
Attorney General except the power to conduct wiretaps,.s
10. Id. § 49(a).
11. Id. § 592(b)(1); see note 13 infra,
12. S. 555, § 596(a). Under this section, a special prosecutor may also be removed for
"malfeasance in office, for willful neglect of duty, for permanent incapacitation, or for
any conduct constituting a felony," An action may be brought before the appointing
panel to challenge the Attorney General's decision to remove the special prosecutor, Id.
The legislation also provides that a particular office of special prosecutor may be
terminated upon the submission by the special prosecutor of written notification to the
Attorney General that his obligations have been fulfilled. Id. § 596(b)(1). The special ap-
pointing panel is also empowered to terminate offices of special prosecutor. Id. § 596(b)(2).
13. Before making the application, the Attorney General may first conduct a pre-
liminary investigation in order to determine whether the allegations of criminal mis-
conduct warrant further investigation and prosecution. Id. § 592(a).
14. The allegations may be relevant to any federal criminal law, other than a law
whose violation would constitute a petty offense. rd. § 591(a).
15. Id. § 591(b)(1), (2) (President, Vice President, and cabinet members); id. § 591(b)(3),
(4), (6) (all persons in Executive Office of President compensated at Level IV of executive
schedule or greater, Justice Department officials compensated at Level III or greater,
Assistant Attorneys General involved in criminal law enforcement, Director or Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and campaign
manager or chairman of President's election or re-election campaign). The special
prosecutor would also supervise Investigation and prosecution of members of Congress in
cases involving receipt or acceptance of any valuable consideration from foreign govern-
ments for the purpose of influencing legislation. Id. § 592(i)(1).
16. Id. § 592(e)(1).
17. Id. § 592(e)(3)(C).
18. Id. § 594(a)(10). Among the special prosecutor's power would be "full power, and
independent authority.., to conduct proceedings before grand juries and other investiga-
tions," "to participate in court proceedings and engage in any litigation including civil
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Court-Appointed Special Prosecutors
This Note seeks to establish a principled constitutional justification
for a court-appointed special prosecutor and to delineate the limits of
his powers. 19 It argues that these issues are best addressed through an
appreciation of the varying interests of the actors and institutions in-
volved at different stages in the criminal process. The Note contends
that the separation of powers does not demand that the executive be
free to control the investigation of executive wrongdoing or to obstruct
the bringing of a valid indictment. It reasons that the principle of
accountability can be viable only when investigations are made and
information reaches the public. If the executive branch is not to be
insulated from the pressures of the political system, the prosecutor must
be free of executive control during his investigation of alleged corrup-
tion. Central to the Note is its recognition that the grand jury plays a
major role in giving content to the basic assumption of the account-
ability concept: the premise that the public will be provided with the
information necessary to alert them to alleged wrongdoing. By focusing
on the grand jury's function as an independent body that can respond
to executive wrongdoing and by recognizing the prosecutor's duties in
aid of the grand jury's investigative function, the Note derives a com-
pelling justification for court appointment of a special prosecutor
empowered to investigate and bring indictments while functioning
independently of the executive. The Note also argues that the provision
in the special prosecutor bill that would, in effect, permit the grand
jury to return indictments without executive concurrence is necessary
to ensure executive accountability. Crucial to this claim is the argu-
ment that the reasoning of the 1965 case of United States v. Cox 20 is
unpersuasive and should no longer be followed. Finally, the Note
concludes that once information has been made public through an
indictment, the political process can check abuse of executive preroga-
and criminal matters," "to appeal any decision of a court in any case or proceeding" in
which the special prosecutor participates, and "to initiate and conduct prosecutions in any
court of competent jurisdiction, frame and sign indictments, file informations, and handle
all aspects of any case in the name of the United States." Id. § 594(a)(1)-(3), (9).
19. This Note does not discuss the serious problems of implementing the special
prosecutor legislation. For discussion of such practical difficulties, see Provision for
Special Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R. 14476, H.R. 11357, H.R. 11999, H.R. 8281, H.R.
8039, H.R. 15634, and Title I of S. 495 Before the Subcomrn. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (Sen. Ribicoff) (staff of
Justice Department estimates that anywhere from 6 to 40 temporary special prosecu-
tors could be required at any one time); id. at 11 (Sen. Kennedy) (danger of proliferation
of temporary special prosecutors). Other unresolved questions raised by the special
prosecutor legislation include selection and certification of lawyers to serve in a special
prosecutor "pool" and accommodation of possible conflicts among special prosecutors with
overlapping jurisdictions.
20. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
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tive. At this stage, grand jury independence no longer serves as a basis
for the special prosecutor's powers, and separation-of-powers considera-
tions necessitate that prosecution be controlled by the executive, sub-
ject to the requirements of Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Hence the special prosecutor legislation is unconstitutional
insofar as it empowers a court-appointed officer to make post-indict-
ment prosecutorial judgments.
I. The Constitutional Framework
Because the prosecutor has traditionally been considered a part of
the executive branch, the constitutionality of court appointment of a
special prosecutor who would be independent of the executive is a
separation-of-powers 21 question. This separation-of-powers issue arises
in the context of the meaning of the appointment clause, which
provides that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
21. Although "separation of powers" is generally understood as a mechanism to prevent
governmental abuses by a diffusion of power, there is much confusion about when in fact
there is such a separation. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAt, THEORY 100 (1971) (distin-
guishing five different, sometimes conflicting concepts encompassed by phrase "separation
of powers"); cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880) (definition of separation
of powers); Corwin, Introduction to LIBRARY OF CONcRss, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at xxii-xxiv (1973) (dis-
cussing evolution of separation-of-powers doctrine). The separation-of-powers concept is
also obscured by the confusion over the meaning of "judicial" and "executive." See M.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 28, 55 (1967) (old view of "execu-
tive" power essentially conception of executing law through courts).
In the intellectual history of the United States, two schools of thought have dominated
analysis of the separation of powers. See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of the
Separation of Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 399-414 (1934). One line of reasoning, as-
sociated with James Wilson, argues for rigid isolation of each branch of government. J.
ANDREW, WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 367 (1896). The other school, identified with James
Madison, is less strict in that it permits a blending of functions. See THE FEDERALIST No.
48 (J. Madison) 308-11 (Rossiter ed. 1961). See also R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33
(1960) (constitutional. convention of 1787 created government of "separated institutions
sharing powers") (emphasis in original). The Madisonian conception is now generally
accepted in the United States. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings and Separation of Functions: Tile Case of the Michigan
One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L.J. 82, 84-86, 89 (1960) (discussion of "functional" view
of separation of powers, which argues that mixing of branches of government is permissible
where abuse of power prevented).
Debate about court-appointment of the special prosecutor takes place within the
Madisonian arena. The problem is not whether there can ever be a mixing of powers and
functions, but what the appropriate boundaries of the judicial and executive roles are.
See Baker, The Proposed Judicially Appointed Independent Office of Public Attorney:
Some Constitutional Objections and An Alternative, 29 Sw. L.J. 671, 675 (1975) (Senate
Minority Leader, an opponent of court-appointed special prosecutors, acknowledging
"areas of overlap and shared responsibilities" among three branches "arising from a sys-
tem of checks and balances").
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inferior Officers, as they think proper ... in the Courts of Law .... 22
Although this language appears to grant unlimited discretion to Con-
gress, it is well settled that the doctrine of separation of powers narrows
the reach of the appointment clause.
2
Recent discussions have regarded two theories, developed during the
nineteenth century in other contexts, as touchstones for interpreting
the appointment clause as it bears upon court appointment of the
special prosecutor..2 4 The "most appropriate branch" theory argues
that the appointing power should be exercised by the judiciary if that
is "the department of the government to which the officer to be ap-
pointed most appropriately belong[s] .' 2' The "incongruity" theory
supports court appointment of inferior officers when "there is no such
incongruity in the [courts' exercise of the appointing power] as to
excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void." 20
The incongruity theory also asks whether "the appointment of the
officers in question could, with any greater propriety, and . . . with
equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other de-
pository of official power."
27
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. See United States v. Cowan, 396 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (court, in holding
that Rule 48(a), see note 109 infra, vested in judiciary power to appoint special prosecu-
tors, considered whether such implementation of appointment clause violated separation
of powers); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (court con-
sidered separation of powers in upholding constitutionality of statute that empowered
district courts to fill temporary vacancies in office of United States Attorney but did not
prevent executive from replacing appointees at will).
24. See notes 25 & 27-28 infra.
25. Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839). In Hennen, the Court held that
a statute empowering the district courts to appoint clerks was constitutional under the
appointment clause. The theory of the case was discussed in Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 398 (1880), where the Court noted that the language in Hennen vesting the appoint-
ment power in the department to which the appointee most appropriately belonged was
meant to guide rather than to limit congressional enactments under the appointment
clause. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 370 (Prof. Paul Freund).
26. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1880).
27. Id. at 398. In Siebold, the Court upheld a federal statute that authorized the cir-
cuit courts to appoint special deputy supervisors for congressional elections. The peti-
tioners contended that the duties of the election supervisors were "entirely executive in
their character" and that no power could be conferred upon the courts of the United
States to appoint officers whose duties were not connected with the judicial branch of
government. Id. at 397.
In rejecting the petitioner's claim, the Court observed: "It is no doubt usual and
proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government,
executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of
such officers appertain." But there was "no absolute requirement to this effect in the
Constitution." Id. Moreover, the Court noted that it would be difficult in many cases to
identify the department to which an office properly belonged. The selection of the ap-
pointing agent was left to the discretion of the Congress. Id. at 397-98.
It has been argued that Siebold "should not be viewed as authorizing a totally un-
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The two appointment clause theories are functional in that they
require a balancing of the interests of the branches of government. But
when these interests overlap, the appointment clause theories provide
no clear answer unless one can differentiate the functional elements
of the issue in question. More specifically, they cannot resolve the
special prosecutor appointment controversy unless one distinguishes
between the prosecutor's "executive" and "investigative" functions.28
limited delegation of appointive powers to the Federal judiciary." 1973 Hearings, supra
note 6, at 350 (statement of Dean Roger Cramton). Dean Cramton contended that Siebold
was merely an affirmation of congressional power to enact legislation pursuant to its duty
to investigate the qualifications of its own members and did not involve criminal law
enforcement. Id. at 351. In Siebold,
[t]he Court passed quickly over what was viewed as a minor objection in a case
involving a major collision between the Federal Government and the States concern-
ing the conduct of state elections in which Federal offices were on the ballot. Con-
sequently, this case is hardly definitive authority for a dissimilar conflict between
two branches of the Federal Government concerning the appointment of an officer
to exercise criminal law enforcement functions.
Id. Siebold has also been distinguished on the ground that in that case, unlike the special
prosecutor situation, "[g]eographic proximity and necessity for quick action in appointing
local election supervisors justified placing the appointing power in a local federal court."
Baker, supra note 21, at 680 n.61; cf. Hobsen v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 921 (D.D.C.
1967) (three-judge court) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("conflicting and ambiguous language in
19th century cases" should not preclude independent evaluation of appointment clause,
with guidance of fundamental doctrines of constitutional structure).
28. Thus far, the special prosecutor debate has not been attuned to such a distinction.
Typically, appointment clause arguments favoring court appointment have taken two
forms. First, it is argued that the special prosecutor would serve as an officer of the
court, 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 2, at 557-58 (memorandum of Profs. S. Breyer and P.
Heymann), and that, therefore, it would be most appropriate that the appointing power
be lodged in the judiciary. Second, it is argued that it is no more incongruous for
courts to appoint special prosecutors than it is for courts to appoint a wide variety of
other officials-including marshals, temporary United States Attorneys, election super-
visors, and members of the District of Columbia Board of Education. See, e.g., 1973 Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 342 (Prof. Paul Freund). Supporters of court appointment could
similarly observe that courts have been empowered to appoint bankruptcy referees, Birch
v. Steele, 165 F. 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1908), United States Commissioners, Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 353 (1931), mental hospital overseers, Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), masters,
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a), and expert witnesses, FED. R. EvID. 706. Moreover, it would be in-
congruous to expect an officer to pursue wrongdoing diligently in the branch that ap-
pointed him. 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 20 (Prof. Archibald Cox). It has also been
contended that Siebold's incongruity concept supports court appointment of the special
prosecutor because the special prosecutor is more closely identified with the promotion of
justice than are election supervisors, for whom Siebold allowed judicial appointment. Id.
at 342 (Prof. Paul Freund).
Opponents of court appointment have also made two main points. First, they argue
that since the special prosecutor is engaged in the enforcement of federal criminal laws,
the most appropriate test of Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839), requires that his
appointment be vested in the executive. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 350 (state-
ment of Dean Roger Cramton); id. at 39 (staff memorandum on unconstitutionality of
independent special prosecutor); cf. Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975:
Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. I, at 264-67 (1975) (statement of Philip A. Lacovara, former counsel to special
prosecutor) (prosecution is inherently executive function); Bickel, On the Special Prose-
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Courts have held that the prosecutor performs a number of functions
that must be subject to executive control, such as decisions to go
forward with prosecution,2 9 to grant witness immunity,30 and to plea-
bargain. 31 In contrast to these executive activities, the prosecutor per-
forms investigative duties-those functions that under the constitu-
tional scheme need not be carried out under executive control.32
The distinction finds strong logical support in constitutional theory.
The theory of checks and balances"- contemplates that the executive
will be accountable to the people through such mechanisms as im-
peachment and the ballot box. For the citizenry to possess the informa-
tion on which accountability depends, a suspect executive must not be
allowed to obstruct processes that may yield damaging allegations. In
short, when the executive is itself the target of inquiry, the executive
cutor, YALE L. REP., Winter 1974, at 24 ("constitutional policy" dictates that special
prosecutor must be in executive branch). Second, they argue that appointment of the
special prosecutor would impose an incongruous duty upon courts because of the danger
that it would tarnish the neutrality of the judiciary and assign it prosecutorial duties.
Baker, sutfra note 21, at 681 (citing Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973)
(Gesell, J.)).
29. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
971 (1976). Among the policy concerns of an executive nature that govern prosecutorial
decisions are considerations of national security and foreign policy, United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 193 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-28 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(executive endowed with enormous power in areas of national defense and international
relations), prosecution resources, United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the determination that
vigorous prosecution of one case will threaten to undermine successful prosecution of
another case, United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Shanahan, 168 F. Supp. 225, 230 (S.D. Ind. 1959) (on motion for reconsideration), judg-
ments about federalism, Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967); see Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discre-
tion, 13 LAW & CONTLMP. PROB. 64, 83-87 (1947), and the climate of public opinion,
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 196 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
31. United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (decision to plea-
bargain presumptively executive).
32. In a series of prosecutorial immunity cases, courts have taken note of a distinction
between investigative and prosecutorial functions. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430-31 (1975); Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 566 (3d Cir. 1977). The in-
vestigative/prosecutorial distinction in immunity cases concerns the scope of the prosecu-
tor's authority rather than the need under certain circumstances to free the prosecutor
from executive control.
33. The theory of checks and balances argues that abuse of power can best be pre-
vented if positive checks are placed on powers of the branches of government. United
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)
(framers established system of checks and balances, where power checks power, in order
to prevent abuse of power); M. VILE, supra note 21, at 18 (definition of checks and
balances). The Madisonian conception of the separation of powers, see note 21 supra, by
permitting a blending of functions, incorporates the notion of checks and balances.
1699
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1692, 1978
must not control the prosecutor's investigative activities, lest the
executive be insulated from the principle of accountability embodied
in the Constitution.
34
Although the justifications for independent investigation of the
executive do not depend on the grand jury, that body supplies the
vehicle for the prosecutor's non-executive, investigative functions. Anal-
ysis of the grand jury as an institution demonstrates the importance of
investigative activity and the appropriateness of court-appointment
under the appointment clause theories.
II. Prosecutor and Grand Jury
The role of the prosecutor as an aid to the grand jury indicates that
court appointment of the special prosecutor is justifiable and does not
unduly restrict executive power. The grand jury is traditionally an
independent body whose existence is secured by the Fifth Amend-
ment;3 5 it is subject neither to legislative nor to executive will. In
its role as a "people's panel,"3 the grand jury serves two functions. As
a shield,3 7 it protects the accused against the power of the executive38
by bringing indictments only upon a showing of probable cause.30 As
a sword 4 -the role most pertinent to the special prosecutor debate-it
provides a check on executive political corruption 41 through its powers
34. For an approach that derives constitutional principles from inferences about
structure, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND REELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). In
these lectures, Professor Black observes that "[t]here is . . . a close and perpetual intcr-
working between the textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for
the structure and relations concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference
drawn from them must surely be controlled by the text." Id. at 31.
35. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... ")
36. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 2-4 (1963); see In re Report & Recommendation.
of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (D.D.C. 1974) (quoting James Wilson's
conception of grand jury as "'great channel of communication'" and as mode for ex-
posing poor governance); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1952)
(grand jury "breathes the spirit of a community into the enforcement of law").
57. In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970).
38. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 390 (1962).
39. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 686 (1972). But see Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand
Jury, 10 AM. CRIm. L. Rav. 701, 748-50 (1972) (instances in which grand jury misused in
order to harass political dissidents).
40. In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970).
41. Note, Discretionary Power in the Judiciary to Organize a Special Investigating
Grand Jury, III U. PA. L. REv. 954, 959 (1963). In its very early history, the grand jury
was an executive adjunct of the sheriff. This role soon changed to that of an agency that
can inquire generally into the misconduct of public officers. Id. at 959; see Kuh, The
Grand Jury 'Presentment': Foul Blow or Fair Play? 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1105-09, 1117
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of investigation and indictment, thus providing information to the
public and helping to ensure executive accountability.
To inquire effectively into executive corruption, the grand jury
must be served by a prosecutor free to make independent judgments.
When the grand jury investigates executive corruption, the need for a
special prosecutor is most immediate, and in such situations the
prosecutor's investigative obligations move in concert with the grand
jury's needs. The role of the grand jury, and its relationship with the
prosecutor, the executive, and the court, demonstrate that a court-
appointed special prosecutor who serves the grand jury in the bringing
of an indictment is constitutionally permissible.
A. Grand Jury and Prosecutor: Independence of the Executive
The grand jury's independent role as a weapon against wrongdoing
in the executive has been dramatically demonstrated at times in our
nation's history when, as an accusatory body, the grand jury has brought
indictments against high public officials.42 But equally important, the
grand jury checks political corruption through its powers as an in-
quisitorial organ.43 Courts have recognized that the grand jury's in-
vestigation of corruption has a constitutional basis, 44 and that the
grand jury possesses "independent legal authority" 45 to investigate and
(1955) (grand jury has developed into check on possible executive abuses); cf. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (President of United States not immune from grand
jury subpoenas).
42. See, e.g., F. BUSCH, ENEMIES OF TIE STATE 123 (1954) ("Teapot Dome" cases); WATER-
GATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, supra note I, at 155-58 ("Watergate" indictments).
43. See Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage? 10 Amr. CRINM. L. REv. 807,
809-10 (1972) (distinction between two grand jury functions significant; grand jury can
perform both); Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures and Problems, 9 COLUMV. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 681, 686 (1973) (describing distinction between grand jury's investigatory and
accusatory powers).
44. See notes 45, 46 & 48 infra (citing cases).
45. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court stated:
We reject the contention, pressed by counsel for the President, that the Executive's
prosecutorial discretion implies an unreviewable power to withhold evidence relevant
to a grand jury's criminal investigation. The federal grand jury is a constitutional
fixture in its own right, legally independent of the Executive .... If the grand jury
were a legal appendage of the Executive, it could hardly serve its historic functions as
a shield for the innocent and a sword against corruption in high places.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the same footnote, the court remarked that "[a]s a practical, as opposed to legal
matter, the Executive may . . . cripple a grand jury investigation by denying staff
assistance to the jury ...." Id. (emphasis in original). But the court concluded that it
was not its role to assume the "burden" of "eviscerating the grand jury's independent
legal authority." Id. The court's view on the practical power of the Executive over the
grand jury is inaccurate because it ignores the ultimate power of Congress to make ap-
propriations and to override the veto of the President. See, e.g., H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3330 (1977) (providing resources for independent grand jury inquiry).
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assemble evidence of criminal activity46 without the consent of the
executive. 47 In this ongoing role as a "grand inquest" whose inquiries
need not be those necessary for bringing indictments, 48 and in its
power to issue reports,49 the grand jury serves as a watchdog of govern-
ment.
In this capacity, the grand jury assumes a posture of active vigilancei °
quite distinct from its role in protecting a defendant against prosecu-
tion in the absence of probable cause. In either role, the grand jury
must be independent of the executive. This independence, however, is
threatened when the grand jury investigates the executive itself, for the
danger is that the executive, through its control of the prosecutor's
allegiance, will act to prevent the exposure of political abuse to public
scrutiny.
The prosecutor, who serves as the grand jury's investigator and con-
sultant on legal issues, is instrumental to that body's effectiveness as a
46. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (grand jury's investigative powers
necessarily broad); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (affirming investigative
power of grand jury); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARv. L. REV.
590 (1961).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ("grand jury may
compel . . . testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate"); Bursey v. United States,
466 F.2d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury "decides what it shall investigate, which
witnesses shall be called, and how the witnesses shall be interrogated").
48. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); see United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Reide, 494 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. E.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 184 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965) (Brown, J., concurring); In rc Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 675-79
(D. Md. 1970). A grand jury report "is an account of an investigation and findings, usually
accusing people of misbehavior, but not indicting anyone." Frankel & Naftalis, The Grand
Jury: An Institution on Trial, 58 NEW LEADER 3, 26 (Nov. 10, 1975); see Dession &: Cohen,
The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687, 705-06 (1932) (distinction
between report and presentment).
The grand jury report has been criticized as a potential vehicle for harassment. See
In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 865-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(court disapproved of grand jury report that publicly censured on basis of evidence
not sufficient to warrant indictment, that portrayed individuals in derogatory context, and
that did not provide victims with judicial forum in which to establish innocence);
Dession & Cohen, supra at 710-11 (criticizing grand jury report). Under controlled cir-
cumstances, however, the grand jury report can serve an ombudsman function. For ex-
ample, the grand jury may wish to indict yet be prevented from doing so when, follow-
ing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), the
piosecutor withholds his signature from the indictment. See In re Grand Jury January
1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 678-80 (D. Md. 1970), discussed in note 82 infra. A second con-
trolled circumstance for the issuance of grand jury reports exists when the report is sealed
and issued for the benefit of impeachment proceedings. See In re Report & Recommenda-
tion of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27, 1230 (D.D.C. 1974) (grand jury
allowed to deliver information gathered to House Judiciary Committee in impeachment
investigation of President since report drew no accusatory conclusions and deprived no
one of official forum in which to respond). See generally Kuh, supra note 41, at 1124-29
(circumstances in which grand jury reports proper).
50. See R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, STONEWALL 71, 246 (1977) (Watergate grand
jurors took active role and provided prosecutors with list of witnesses they wanted to hear).
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watchdog for political corruption. Indeed, the court recognizes the
importance of the prosecutor as the grand jury's legal adviser"' when
it invites the grand jurors to complain to the bench if they conclude
that the prosecutor has failed to provide assistance or advice.5 2 In this
role as adviser to the grand jury, the prosecutor's investigative function
is of prime importance.
It is no doubt true that in practice the prosecutor often appears before
the grand jury, not to serve the people's panel, but to use its process on
behalf of executive interests.53 The non-executive responsibilities of
the prosecutor must, however, take priority when he is serving the
grand jury, particularly in the context of executive accountability.
When the political fortunes of the executive branch are not at stake, a
clash between grand jury and executive interests is unlikely. But
when the executive is under inquiry, there is a danger that an
executive-appointed prosecutor who is loyal to the branch that endowed
him with his office will neglect his constitutionally rooted investigative
functions and thus undermine the grand jury's established role as an
independent check against executive corruption. The determination
that the prosecutor in such instances should be aligned with the grand
jury rather than with the executive is based on the essential difference
between the roles played by the executive and the grand jury in the
criminal process.
Executive involvement in this process is extensive and continues well
beyond the point at which the grand jury's functions have ended. There
51. United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 704 (W.D. La. 1949); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 16 (1960), reprinted in Federal Grand Jury:
Hearings on H.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 277-97 (1976) (United States Attorney is grand jury's "constant legal adviser" but
is not to be regarded as infallible).
52. Charge to the Grand Jury, 12 F.R.D. 495, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (Goodman, J.).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959) (grand jury is law enforcement agency). The conception of the grand jury as
an "arm of the executive" has been succinctly set forth: "The show is run by the
prosecutors-the Federal United States Attorney and his assistants. . . . The prosecutors
decide what is to be investigated, who will be brought before the grand jurors and-
practically and generally speaking-who should be indicted for what." Frankel & Naftalis,
supra note 49, at 9. In practice, the court often calls the grand jury into session
at the prosecutor's request. D. MERNITZ, A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY
PROCEDURE § 2:1 (1968).
Although in practice the prosecutor can have wide influence in grand jury proceedings,
he cannot abuse the grand jury, and his powers before that body are limited. Thus, he
cannot comment on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Wells, 163
F. 313, 325-26 (D. Idaho 1908). Moreover, he is not permitted at grand jury deliberations.
FED. R. Cri.f. P. 6(d). The existence of separate, and sometimes overriding, grand jury
interests is demonstrated when the court dismisses an indictment because the prosecutor
has acted in bad faith before the grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d
781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
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are many post-grand jury junctures-such as the plea-bargaining stage
and the trial itself-at which executive concerns can be promoted by
the prosecutor.54 Even if executive interests do not predominate at the
g-rand jury stage, they may prevail later. For the grand jury, by contrast,
there is no second chance. Unless the grand jury is effective in its in-
vestigations at the early stages of the criminal process, it will have
little functional significance as a sword against corruption. The health
of the political system itself may suffer as a result, for the grand jury
stands as the last independent ombudsman in the process. If the
prosecutor owes allegiance not to the grand jury but to the executive,
the checks-and-balances principle of accountability may very well be
subverted because the citizenry may be denied information necessary
for informed governance. When the prosecutor appears before a grand
jury investigating executive corruption, grand jury needs outweigh
those of the executive, and the prosecutor must accordingly be aligned
with grand jury and not executive concerns. It is thus essential that,
when the executive is suspected of wrongdoing, the officer who serves
the grand jury should be appointed by a body standing outside the
executive branch.
B. Court Appointment
Because, at the investigation and indictment stages, the special
prosecutor's functions are limited to those more closely identified with
grand jury process than with executive concerns, court appointment
can be justified by either of the two appointment clause theories. Court
appointment of the special prosecutor in his grand jury role is "most
appropriate" on the theory that the grand jury is an "arm of the
court." 55 The arm-of-the-court conception, and the consequent appro-
priateness of court appointment, are supported by the court's powers to
initiate grand jury deliberations"6 and to supervise them once begun .5
54. See note 109 infra.
55. See, e.g., In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1975) (federal grand jury
is "an arm of the district court through which it derives its power"); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1975) (grand jury "is
an appendage of the court").
56. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) ("The court shall order one or more grand juries to be
summoned at such times as the public interest requires.") The court also appoints the
foreman and deputy foreman, id. at 6(c), hears challenges to individual grand jurors, id.
at 6(b)(1), has the power to excuse a juror either permanently or temporarily, id. at 6(g),
and determines when matters occurring before the grand jury may be disclosed "pre-
liminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding," id. at 6(e).
57. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) ("[P]owers of the grand jury are
not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge .... "); United States v.
Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975) (with regard to its function of investigation,
1704
Vol. 87: 1692, 1978
Court-Appointed Special Prosecutors
Thus, the judge charges the grand jurors8 and may instruct them as
to matters of law.59 His assistance is essential to the success of grand jury
investigations. 0 Witnesses are summoned to attend and to give testi-
mony by means of judicial process, and they may be compelled to
testify after appearance by court order. 61 The integrity of the grand
jury, as an arm of the court, is protected by the judiciary's power to
punish prosecutorial misconduct 62 and to prevent abuse of the sub-
poena.0
3
If the grand jury is viewed, not as an arm of the court, but rather
as an independent institution that defies classification, 4 the judicial
branch may still be, simply by default, the most appropriate appointing
instrumentality. This argument draws on the incongruity test as well: it
is incongruous for the executive to appoint the official charged with in-
vestigating alleged executive wrongdoing. At the same time, history65
"grand jury is essentially an agency of the court, and exercises its powers under the
authority and supervision of the court"). The court is also authorized during or after
deliberations to expunge unauthorized grand jury action. United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d
794, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1975) (grand jury exceeded its power and authority in charging
petitioners with criminal conduct without indicting them); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
479 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1972) (court ordered expunction of parts of grand jury report
relating to nonfederal subject matters and serving no federal purpose). Significantly, how-
ever, the judge may not be present when the grand jury is deliberating or voting. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(d). Moreover, the court may not limit the scope of investigation. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1972).
58. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1952); see Kaufman,
The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1954) (example of charge to
federal grand jury in Southern District of New York).
59. Note, supra note 43, at 703.
60. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (despite grand jury's "great in-
dependence in many areas," it is "powerless to perform its investigative function without
the court's aid").
61. Id.
62. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) (dictum) (court can invoke
Fourth Amendment to deny unreasonably general grand jury subpoena duces tecum);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (subpoenas impermissible when under-
taken not for purposes of law enforcement but in order to harass press); In re Black, 47
F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1931) (grand jury subpoena may not be used for ulterior purposes).
64. See, e.g., In re Dymo Indus., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ("The
grand jury is a creation of the Fifth Amendment and is not wholly identifiable with any
one of the three traditional branches of government.")
65. Judges have held the appointment power since colonial times. A. VANDERBILT, THE
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 113-20 (1953).
Indeed, section 32 of the Draft Bill of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the
office of Attorney General would be filled by the Supreme Court. C. Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 108-09 (1923).
The fact that the drafters entertained such a provision demonstrates that the notion of
judicial appointment was not unheard of in 1789.
Moreover, the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate the creation of an execu-
tive department for law enforcement. The Attorney General was originally a legal adviser
to the President, not the head of a prosecutorial arm of government. It was not until 1870
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and state practice36 demonstrate that it would not be incongruous for
a court to appoint the special prosecutor.
III. The Scope of the Special Prosecutor's
Authority: The Cox Problem
Court appointment of the special prosecutor is not by itself sufficient
to ensure that the executive will be held accountable for its misdeeds.
If the grand jury, assisted by the special prosecutor, is to be an effective
check on wrongdoing, it must be able to bring indictments against the
executive. The indictment is crucial because it exposes alleged corrup-
tion to public pressure and subjects misconduct to the reach of legal
process.6 7 The special prosecutor bill, by providing that the special
that the Department of Justice was organized and the Attorney General given control over
all federal legal officers. H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 7, 20, 224-25
(1937); L. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 4-8 (1967) (early legislators did not want
to vest executive branch with enforcement power that could deprive citizens of their
freedoms). Hence it would be a fallacy to argue that court appointment of the special
prosecutor would disrupt the distribution of power that the framers incorporated into
the Constitution. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 565 (testimony of Prof. Philip
Heymann) (since prosecution was largely conducted by private citizens for 10 or 15 years
after 1789, it appears that framers did not believe that this task had to be carried out
by President).
The historical argument, although suggestive, is not dispositive because it finds no
specific constitutional support. Indeed, the failure of the final version of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 to provide for Supreme Court appointment of the Attorney General
could have been a reflection of the belief that vesting such power in a court would violate
the constitutional scheme.
66. Most state courts are authorized by statute to appoint special prosecutors when
"the regular district attorney is absent, disqualified because of interest, or fails or refuses
to perform his duties," Note, The Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 577, 579-83 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Special Prosecutor]; see 1974
Hearings, suPra note 5, at 362 (citing 42 states "whose statutes or cases have empowered
judges to appoint special prosecutors"). See generally Note, Legal Methods for the Sup-
p~ression of Organized Crime: Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor (pt. III), 48 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 531 (1958). State courts have also invoked the "inherent
power" doctrine as a basis for appointing special prosecutors. E.g., People ex rel. Lindsley
v. District Court, 29 Colo. 5, 15-16, 66 P. 896, 898-99 (1901) (judge has inherent power to
appoint special prosecutor to advise grand jury in place of district attorney implicated in
crimes under investigation); State ex rel. Thomas v. Henderson, 123 Ohio St. 474, 478, 175
N.E. 865, 866-67 (1931) (court has inherent power to appoint special prosecutor to assist
grand jury); Lizar v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. 56, 63-64, 166 P.2d 119, 123 (1946) (court has'
inherent power to appoint special attorney to preserve machinery of justice); see Special
Prosecutor, supra at 580-82 (discussion of inherent power doctrine).
In Connecticut, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a statute provid-
ing for judicial appointment of prosecutors. See State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 325
A.2d 199, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (statute did not violate separation of powers
because state's attorney not merely executive officer).
67. Upon indictment, a court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, may issue a
summons ordering the defendant to appear before the court or a warrant for the de-
fendant's arrest. FrD. R. CRIM. P. 9. A grand jury report, by contrast, does not subject the
accused to the legal process. When a report is published, the accused may flee or the
witnesses may escape the court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the statute of limitations may run
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prosecutor may frame and sign indictments, 68 recognizes that the ef-
fectiveness of the grand jury can be promoted only if it is free to bring
indictments without the consent of the executive.
A major challenge to the special prosecutor scheme is the contention
that an indictment is valid only if signed by an executive official. Since
the special prosecutor is neither appointed by nor answerable to the
executive, it is argued, an indictment signed by the special prosecutor
cannot be valid.
The crucial decision supporting this argument is United States v.
Cox,69 a case that presented to the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, an
issue new to the jurisprudence of the federal courts: whether Rule 7(c),
which provides that an indictment "shall be signed by the attorney for
the government," 70 is a recognition that the validity of an indictment
depends upon the approval of the executive.7 1 In Cox, a case from the
civil rights era, a federal grand jury in Mississippi sought to indict for
perjury two black government witnesses in a voting rights case against
a local registrar.7 2 The United States Attorney, following instructions
from then-Acting Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, refused
either to prepare or to sign any such indictment.73 District Judge
Harold Cox, who had ordered the United States Attorney to draft the
indictments and to sign them,7 4 held him in contempt and imposed a
jail sentence for disregard of his ruling.
75
On appeal by the government, a divided court overturned the judge's
order requiring the United States Attorney to sign the indictment and
so as to permanently bar prosecution for the alleged crime. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 180 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Rives, Gewin, and Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
68. S. 555, § 594(a)(9).
69. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). For statements
concerning the significance of Cox to the special prosecutor debate, see 1973 Hearings,
supra note 6, at 64 (Sen. Fong); id. at 181 (Sen. Taft); id. at 353 (statement of Dean Roger
Cramton).
At least one major commentator treats Cox as dispositive on the executive's power to
thwart indictment. 8 Mooa,'s FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.04 at 6-64 (2d ed. 1977) (proposition
that prosecutor "can effectively prevent the grand jury from acting" by refusing to sign
indictment "authoritatively established" by Cox); see 18 VAND. L. REv. 2062 (1965); 51 VA.
L. REv. 533 (1965).
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
71. 342 F.2d at 171.
72. Id. at 193-94 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 169-70.
74. Id. at 169. In effect, Judge Cox instigated the grand jury indictment. During the
voting rights trial, at which he presided, Judge Cox stated that he wanted "'to hear from
the government about why this Court shouldn't require this Negro Reverend W.G. Goff
and his companion Kendrick to show cause why they shouldn't be bound over to await
the action of the grand jury for perjury.'" 342 F.2d at 194 n.21 (Wisdom, J., concurring)
(quoting trial record).
75. Id. at 170.
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also reversed his contempt citation.7 6 Four of the seven judges held that
Judge Cox could not compel the executive, as personified by the
prosecutor, to sign the "draft indictment" and thus vitalize the instru-
ment;7 7 a different four-three combination agreed that courts may
order United States Attorneys to assist a gand jury by drafting "forms
of indictment" according to the jury's wishes.
78
Viewing the case in its civil rights context,70 one can only applaud
the fact that, as a result of Cox, the two government witnesses were
spared the burden of a trial.80 It is unfortunate, however, that in its
effort to reach a holding that freed the executive from the obligation
of going forward with prosecution, the courts' was not more respectful
of the grand jury's special role as a guarantor of executive account-
ability. In Cox the grand jury had been operating as a screening device
protecting citizens, not as an investigative mechanism for exposing
political wrongdoing. Nonetheless the Cox holding that executive con-
currence, as embodied in the prosecutor's signature, is essential to an
indictment's validity was later decisive in thwarting a grand jury's
desire to issue indictments against corruption.82 If the historic notion
76. Id. at 172. There were four opinions in the case. Judge Jones wrote the opinion
for the court, in which Chief Judge Tuttle fully joined. Id. at 169-73. Judge Brown wrote
a separate concurring opinion, id. at 182-85, and Judge Wisdom wrote a special concur-
rence, id. at 185-96. Judges Rives, Gewin, and Bell joined in an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. Id. at 173-81. The dissenters would have affirmed the judg-
ment of civil contempt against the United States Attorney. They concurred, however, with
the majority's procedural rulings, which denied the issuance of a writ of prohibition
barring Judge Cox from enforcing his order and dismissed the appeal of the Acting At-
torney General from that order.
77. Id. at 172 (Tuttle, C.J., and Jones, Brown, and Wisdom, JJ.).
78. In his separate concurrence, Judge Brown argued that the United States Attorney
is required to draft forms of indictment upon the request of the grand jury. 342 F.2d at
182. The three dissenters, Judges Rives, Gewin, and Bell, agreed with this position but
went further in their holding that the United States Attorney is required to sign any in-
dictment that may be found by the grand jury. Id. at 181.
79. There can be no doubt that the civil rights era of the 1960s was a great chapter in
American history, a period when the ideal of law as an agent for justice was given sub-
stance. S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976). The
success of the federal effort is all the more impressive when one considers the attitudes of
some of the federal judges. See C. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN
FEDERAL JUDGEs AND BLACK VOTERS 132-33, 155-56 (1973) (comparison of Judge Frank M.
Johnson, who was sympathetic to civil rights enforcement, with Judge Harold Cox, who
was uncooperative).
80. In his special concurrence, Judge Wisdom noted that the government witnesses, if
prosecuted, ran "the risk of being tried in a climate of community hostility." 342 F.2d
at 196.
81. Throughout this Note, the phrases "the Cox court," "the court," or "the Cox
opinion" are meant to signify the views embodied in the opinion written by Judge Jones
for the court.
82. In 1970, a Baltimore grand jury investigating possible corruption in connection
with federal construction projects wanted to vote indictments. In re Grand Jury January
1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970). Two United States Attorneys agreed with this con-
clusion but were forbidden to sign the indictments by higher officials in the Justice
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of the grand jury as the people's ombudsman is to retain any vitality,
the Cox argument must be rejected. The prosecutor's signature should
be considered irrelevant to an indictment's validity because the grand
jury has the power to indict without executive concurrence; the execu-
tive, however, may move under Rule 48(a) to have the court dismiss
the indictment.s3
In concluding that the signature rule required ultimate prosecutorial
control over the bringing of indictments, the Cox court engaged in a
process of reasoning that might be described as "backward tracking"; it
reached its holding indirectly by arguing from assumptions about the
breadth of prosecutorial discretion and the nature of Rule 48(a). Re-
grettably, the court considered the grand jury solely in terms of its
role as a shield for the accused and did not recognize its function as
an affirmative check on political corruption in the executive. This
narrow conception of the grand jury, implicit in the court's view of the
nature of prosecutorial discretion, permitted the Cox court to arrive at
its mistaken holdings with respect to Rules 7(c) and 48(a). The opinion
further erred in its failure to give appropriate attention to the tradi-
tional role of the prosecutor's signature on an indictment.
1. The Legislative History of Rule 7(c)
Though the main issue in Cox was the significance of the signature
requirement of Rule 7(c), the court opinion made no attempt to
establish whether case law supplied the signature with substantive im-
portance. In fact, it is clear that the Cox holding that a signature is
necessary to vitalize an indictment fundamentally alters the traditional
prosecutor-grand jury relationship.
a. Common Law Roots of Rule 7(c)
At early common law, in an age when even prosecution for criminal
offenses was initiated by private parties,84 the prosecuting officer
neither attended grand jury sessions nor signed indictments. 5 With
Department. Id. at 678. The court held that Cox controlled and that the grand jury
could not indict without the prosecutor's signature. Id. at 674.
83. This conception is essentially the one posited in the dissenting opinion of Judges
Rives, Gewin, and Bell, 342 F.2d at 179-80. The dissenters, however, did not suggest how
they would have dealt with a Rule 48(a) motion had it been before them. See note 109
infra.
84. Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U.L. Rv. 754,
756-59, 762 (1976).
85. State v. Reed, 67 Me. 127, 129 (1877); State v. Farrar, 41 N.H. 53, 60 (1860); Brown
v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466, 468, 10 S.E. 745, 746 (1890). The private prosecutor was
often required to endorse the indictment because in specified circumstances he was liable
to pay the costs of frivolous, malicious, or unsuccessful proceedings. 1 J. BisHOP, Naw
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the advent of public prosecution and the collaboration of the grand
jury and the prosecutor, the inclusion of the prosecutor's signature on
the indictment became common practice and was even required by some
state statutes., State cases indicate that the signature was regarded as
a ministerial function. 87 Although state precedent does not directly
address the problem of a conscious refusal to sign in an attempt to
thwart the grand jury's decision to bring an indictment, dicta support
the principle that since the grand jury is a distinct and autonomous
body, its power to indict cannot depend on the consent of the
prosecutor.88
Federal cases decided prior to Rule 7(c) express a similar conception
of the signature. Although not arising out of situations in which the
executive sought to stifle grand jury decisions, they are enlightening in
that they treat the signature either as a certification to the court that
the prosecutor has performed his required service to the grand jury80
or as a mode by which the prosecutor attests the action of the grand
jury.90 This latter view finds support in the language of a Supreme
Court opinion.91 History thus does not support the Cox notion that
the signature was necessary at common law to vitalize the indict-
ment. Moreover, Rule 7(c) did not depart from the common law
understanding.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 691 (4th ed. 1895); W. CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 48 (Mikell ed.
1918).
86. 1 J. BISHOP, sukra note 85, § 703; W. CLARK, supra note 85, § 48.
87. The prosecutor's signature has been held to be the work of the grand jury's
"scribe." See Duke v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 563 (1858). It has also been described as an
instrument for identification. See People v. Foster, 60 Misc. 3, 15, 112 N.Y.S. 706, 714 (Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1908).
88. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 67 Me. 127, 129 (1877) (if signature were essential to
validity of indictment, grand jury would be completely under control of prosecuting
attorney); People v. Foster, 60 Misc. 3, 19, 112 N.Y.S. 706, 716 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1908) (power
of grand jury to indict not dependent upon consent of district attorney); cf. Anderson v.
State, 5 Ark. 444, 453 (1844) (valid indictment need only be found by grand jury and
endorsed by foreman); State v. Squire, 10 N.H. 558, 560 (1840) (indictments found solely
by grand jury).
89. United States v. McAvoy, 26 F. Cas. 1044 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 15,654); see
United States v. Sheffield Farms Co., 43 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (signature only matter
of form, not going to substance of indictment).
90. See Miller v. United States, 300 F. 529, 536 (6th Cir. 1924) (by implication).
91. See Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 475 (1904):
The indictment embodies charges made by grand jurors, and the signature of the
United States Attorney merely attests the action of the grand jury, whereas an in-
formation rests upon the responsibility of the attorney representing the Government,
and imports an investigation of the facts by him in his official capacity.
By definition, an indictment is an accusation found by the oath of 12 jurors. An informa-
tion is the allegation of only a single individual, the prosecuting attorney. Weeks v.
United States, 216 F. 292, 293 (2d Cir. 1914). On the use of indictment and information,
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (Indictment and Information) (capital offense may not be
prosecuted under information, but if indictment is waived, an offense that may be





Before the adoption of Rule 7(c) in 1946,92 there was no federal re-
quirement that the prosecuting officer sign his name on the indict-
ment.°3 If the signature requirement of Rule 7(c) was meant to in-
stitute a departure from established practice, one might have expected
the Advisory Committee Notes to so indicate; they are, however, silent
on this question. 94 The claim that Rule 7(c) establishes the necessity of
executive concurrence is further undermined by examination of earlier
drafts of the rule, which suggest that the inclusion of the signature
language in the final draft may have been inadvertent.95
92. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on March 21, 1946.
Vanderbilt, Foreword to FED. R. CRIM. P. (1946).
93. Miller v. United States, 300 F. 529, 536 (6th Cir. 1924).
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c), Notes.
95. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the in-
dictment form typically stated that "[t]he grand jurors ... accuse. ... The signature
of the prosecuting attorney was not included in the form of the indictment. ALI CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 152, at 69-70 (6th draft 1931) (model section); see id. at 537
(typical indictment forms provided by state statutes). By contrast, the information form
stated that the prosecuting attorney makes the accusation. See id. § 153 (model section); id.
at 537-38. The signature of the prosecuting attorney was required on the information. See
id. § 151, at 69 (model section); id. at 535-37 (typical state information forms required
vertification by prosecuting attorney). The differences in the prosecutor's role in the
preparation of an information and an indictment, articulated in Crowley v. United States,
194 U.S. 461, 475 (1904), see note 91 supra, make it understandable that his signature should
be essential to an information's validity, though not necessary for an indictment.
The early drafts of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reveal a conception of the
prosecutor's signature that conformed to the practice just described. Rule 8 of the Pre-
liminary Draft, FED. R. CRIM. P., PRELIMINARY DRAFT WITH NOTES AND FORMS (1943), en-
titled "The Indictment and the Information," contained six sections. Section (c), Signing
and Filing of Information, stated: "The information shall be signed by the attorney for
the government and may be filed only by leave of court." Id. at 28. Section (d), Nature
and Contents, stated: "The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It need
not contain a formal commencement, a formal conclusion, or any other matter not neces-
sary to such statement .... I Id. In short, the preliminary draft required a prosecutor's
signature only on an information.
In the final version of the rule on indictment and information (current Rule 7), the
requirement of obtaining leave-of-court to file an information was abolished; hence, sec-
tion (c) of Rule 8 of the preliminary draft-Signing and Filing of Information-was
omitted. Instead, the signing requirement was incorporated into section (c) of Rule 7,
a provision that, like section (d) of the analogous draft rule, refers to both the indictment
and the information. Rule 7(c) now states:
Nature and Contents . . . . The indictment or the information shall be a plain,
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. It shall be signed by the attorney for the government. It need not contain
a formal commencement, a formal conclusion or any other matter not necessary to
such statement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (emphasis added). The argument could be made that in their search
for economy of language, the drafters inadvertently transposed a phrase from an abolished
section (Rule 8(c) of the PRELIMINARY DRAFT); thus a signature requirement that had
applied only to the information could now be taken to refer to both the indictment and
the information. Unfortunately, subsequent proceedings on the rules make no mention of
the attorney's signature. See 6 NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH NOTES AND PROCEEDINGS (1946).
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Cases interpreting Rule 7 show no recognition of a change. They
continue to speak only of the "authenticating" function of the
prosecutor's signature.96 With the exception of Cox and its limited
progeny,97 these cases do not discuss the significance of the signature
in the wider, more fundamental context of executive-grand jury rela-
tionships because they arise out of situations in which there is no
divergence of interest between the prosecutor and the grand jury.98
But like the pre-Rule 7 cases, they neither support the Cox holding nor
conflict with the established conception of the indictment as an instru-
ment given life by the grand jury alone.
2. Cox and Prosecutorial Discretion
The lack of support from precedent and legislative history would
not of course be determinative if the Cox interpretation of Rule 7(c)
were constitutionally mandated. indeed, the holding that the executive
can frustrate the grand jury's desire to indict rests on a premise that
"[i]t follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers,
that courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretion-
ary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over
criminal prosecutions." 99 This view, however, is incorrect and, more-
over, led the court to a further error with respect to Rule 48(a).
a. The Mistaken Assumption
Cox's basic assumption of absolute prosecutorial control has not
withstood the test of time. Judicial intervention in plea-bargaining
cases, 100 for example, demonstrates that there are limits to the execu-
96. See, e.g., United States v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, United States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1973) (signature necessary
only as evidence of authenticity of indicting document); Wheatley v. United States, 159
F.2d 599, 600 (4th Cir. 1946). The Cox dissenters also believed that the signature serves
only an authenticating function. 342 F.2d at 177 (Rives, Gewin, and Bell, JJ., dissenting).
97. See In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 673-74 (D. Md. 1970).
98. In the typical scenario, an indictment is found and filed in court without the
prosecutor's signature. The prosecutor tries the case, the defendant is convicted and then
challenges the conviction because of the absence of the prosecutor's signature. See, e.g.,
United States v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, United
States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1973); cf. United States v. Vance, 256 F.2d
82 (6th Cir. 1958) (defendants argued indictment invalid because signed by Assistant U.S.
Attorney and not by U.S. Attorney).
99. 342 F.2d at 171. The Cox court, however, made no attempt to define discretion.
100. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (denial of due process for new
prosecutor to refuse to honor predecessor's promise that had induced a defendant's guilty
plea); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (trial judge may
withhold approval of guilty pleas when "the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a
departure from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial dis-
cretion"); cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 669 (1978) ("undoubtedly [there are] con-
stitutional limits" on exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
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tive's control over criminal prosecution. More fundamentally, the
court's concept of absolute prosecutorial discretion was based, at least
in part, on a misapplication of precedent. The cases cited in the Cox
opinion and Judge Wisdom's concurrence do not deal with the ques-
tion of whether the executive can ignore at will the grand jury's
decision to indict.10' Some of these "authorities" address situations in
which the executive is pitted not against the court or the grand jury,
but against private individuals.' 02 The courts have upheld prosecutorial
101. The "controlling" cases cited in Cox can be found at 342 F.2d at 171 n.8. In actu-
ality, they are irrelevant. For example, the federal cases cited, Dear Wing Jung v. United
States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1963), and Sweptson v. United States, 289 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962), merely deal with relations between prosecutors and
administrative agencies. In Dear Wing Jung, the court simply stated that a defendant in a
prosecution for false and fraudulent representation could not ask the trial court to sub-
poena the documents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning alleged
prosecution lists, since the decision whether to prosecute in the first place rested not with
the Service but with the United States Attorney. See 312 F.2d at 75. Similarly in Sweptson,
the court merely held that the United States Attorney was not bound by proceedings be-
fore the United States Commissioner. 289 F.2d at 170. People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92
N.E.2d 881 (1950), rev'd, People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844, 256
N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1965), also has no bearing on Cox. Florio deals with the prosecutorial
role in recommending indictments, and, in fact, upholds the grand jury's competence in
choosing among statutes upon which indictments are based.
Judge Wisdom also cited cases that do not stand for the proposition that the prosecutor
may freely disregard the grand jury's desire to indict. 342 F.2d at 192 (citing United States
v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920); Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955)). In
Goldberg, the Government was prosecuting pursuant to a grand jury indictment and the
court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the accused's petition for mandamus to the At-
torney General and Assistant Attorney General to compel them to withdraw the indict-
ment. In Thompson, the Court refused to quash an indictment covering matters that had
been submitted to and ignored by one grand jury and were then resubmitted to another
grand jury without leave-of-court. Thompson is not persuasive because it does not involve
the prosecutor's control over bringing indictments, as in Cox, but deals with the right of
the Government to go forward with prosecution when it so desires. Indeed, the case con-
stitutes an affirmation of prosecutorial dependence upon grand jury approval.
Two other cases presented by Judge Wisdom, 342 F.2d at 191, to support absolute
prosecutorial discretion have been superseded by Rule 48(a). The two cases-the Confisca-
tion Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869), and United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D. Mont.
1924)-stood for the old common-law rule that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle
prosequi without any action by the court. However, as is stated in the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 48(a) changed the old rule
in the federal system. The Notes indicate that the Confiscation Cases and Woody have
been superseded by Rule 48(a).
102. For example, the Cox opinion cited Hassan v. Magistrates Court, 20 Misc. 2d 509,
191 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1959), and Murphy v. Sumners, 54 Tex. Crim. 369, 112 SAV.
1070 (Crim. App. 1908). 342 F.2d at 171 n.8. In both Hassan and Mur1hy, the courts refused
to grant mandamus when the petitioner sought to compel the prosecutor to initiate
criminal proceedings. In neither case had indictments been found. Both cases were ex-
amples of unsuccessful attempts at a kind of private prosecution.
In addition, Judge Wisdom's concurrence, 342 F.2d at 191-92, cited the following
"private prosecution" cases: Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd sub
norm. Pugach v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (court refused mandamus action
by private citizen against U.S. Attorney General and Director of FBI, emphasizing public
nature of prosecution), and Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (court denied
action by pri~ate citizen seeking writ of mandamus to compel U.S. Attorney to prosecute).
Neither case involved situations in which the grand jury had acted.
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discretion in these circumstances in order to protect against the dangers
of private prosecution, 10 3 including circumvention of the grand jury. 04
Far from supporting an alleged prosecutorial right to disregard the
grand jury, the "private prosecution" cases cited in the Cox opinion
and by Judge Wisdom attest to the importance of that body.
The Cox opinion's mistaken assumption of absolute prosecutorial
discretion was also a product of the court's fundamental failure to
appreciate fully the grand jury's role. Though the court recognized the
grand jury's function as finder of probable cause, 0 5 it did not consider
the argument that, in light of the grand jury's historic role as a check
on executive abuses, the checks-and-balances principle of accountability
demands that the prosecutor not be allowed to disregard the people's
panel.10 6 Given the factual context of Cox,10 7 the court probably
viewed the issue before it as a judge-executive conflict rather than a
grand jury-executive conflict. 08 This perception, coupled with a narrow
understanding of the grand jury's role, permitted the court to over-
emphasize the importance of protecting prosecutorial discretion at the
indictment stage. Had the court recognized the checks-and-balances
considerations in favor of grand jury independence, it might have
been more inclined to strike a careful balance.
b. Prosecutorial Discretion and Rule 48(a): The Nolle
The failure of the Cox court to appreciate the importance of pro-
tecting the integrity of the independent grand jury is also reflected in
103. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The federal courts
have customarily refused to order prosecution of particular individuals at the instance of
private persons."); ci. Comment, supra note 84, at 763 (American colonists turned away
from private prosecution system of their English forebearers and turned to concept of
public prosecutor because they "recognized a need to have criminal proceedings ad-
ministered by impartial government officials rather than by interested private parties").
104. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d
Cir. 1973) (courts should not compel prosecution at instance of private parties in absence
of indictment because such procedure evades grand jury, which serves "to protect the
accused's reputation from public damage based upon insufficient, improper, or even
malicious charges"); Kennan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610, 611 (Ist Cir. 1964) (court held
that state prisoner could not initiate criminal prosecution in his own name in federal
court by complaint alleging that state officers had conspired to deprive him of rights,
saying that to sanction such a private prosecution procedure "would be to provide a
means to circumvent the legal safeguards provided for persons accused of crime, such as
-.. indictment by a grand jury").
105. 342 F.2d at 171 ("The role of the grand jury is restricted to a finding as to
whether or not there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed.")
106. See pp. 1701-04 supra.
107. See pp. 1707-08 suPra.
108. See p. 1712 supra.
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its misinterpretation of Rule 48(a). 100 Had the court perceived that
Rule 48(a) represents a system of limitations on the executive designed
to preserve the grand jury, it might not have concluded that the
signature requirement of Rule 7(c) provides a vehicle for executive
control.
The court argued that there has always existed some juncture at
which the executive could freely prevent a criminal prosecution and
that, before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
in 1946, the Attorney for the United States could at his discretion enter
an unreviewable nolle prosequil"° of a criminal charge at any time
after indictment and before trial."' Hence, if Rule 7(c) were not
construed to preserve for the prosecutor a point of absolute freedom
to prevent an indictment by withholding signature, then the require-
ment of Rule 48 that leave-of-court be obtained for dismissal of a
pending prosecution might be an unconstitutional interference with
prosecutorial discretion. 112
In essence, this argument infers from the prosecutor's previous un-
bridled use of the nolle a requirement that the executive be free to
disregard a grand jury's decision to indict. The inference is unpersua-
sive because it mistakes a past practice for a constitutional justification.
The power of prosecutors to invoke the nolle at will has never been
subjected to a constitutional test. More fundamentally, the court failed
to understand the origins and evolution of the nolle; this history does
not countenance the outcome in Cox.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 48(a) in 1946, federal courts did
follow the common law tradition of permitting the prosecutor to
dismiss a case by filing a nolle prosequi without court approval.1" 3 This
practice, however, must be understood in light of its origins. The nolle
can be traced to sixteenth-century England and a legal system in which
criminal prosecutions were conducted entirely by private citizens, with
the sovereign only a nominal party." 4 The power to nolle was vested
in a single official-the Attorney General of England-and was in-
tended to serve as a check on the abuses of a system in which prosecu-
109. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). ("The Attorney General or the United States attorney may
by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the
prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial
without the consent of the defendant.")
110. Nolle prosequi means "I am unwilling to prosecute."
111. 342 F.2d at 170-71.
112. Id. at 172.
113. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1869); United States v. Woody,
2 F.2d 262 (D. Mont. 1924); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 102-03 (S.D. Ill.
1945); United States v. Krakowitz, 52 F. Supp. 774, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1943).
114. Comment, Nolle Prosequi, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 996, 997 (1966).
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tions were initiated by individuals seeking vengeance."15 The nolle was
intended to be used only when the private system failed the public
good; contrary to the Cox conception, it was not originally conceived
as a device to be invoked against the grand jury. Indeed, it was reserved
for only the "most unusual" cases,."
One might imagine that the public prosecution system in the United
States would have obviated the need for the nolle prosequi. But the
nolle did make the journey across the Atlantic,'"7 and, in contrast to
the English practice, it was freely exercised in this country by a de-
centralized network of prosecutors." 8 The scandals that often accom-
panied the extensive use of the nolle" 9 eventually led most states to
limit prosecutorial exercise of the nolle, either through statute 20 or
judicial decision.12 ' Such restrictions, which usually required court
approval of the nolle, restored and reinforced the power of the grand
jury.
The Cox court did not recognize that on the federal level Rule
48(a) was a development consistent with state limitations on the nolle
designed to protect the grand jury from prosecutorial disregard. It is
true that, other than a statement by the Advisory Committee that Rule
48(a) conforms to the practice prevalent in many states, 22 "[t]here is
scant historical material as to its purpose.' ' 1 23 Courts, however, have
115. R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 150-51 (1929) (nolIe intended to
be used "to prevent grave injustice"); Note, The Nolle Prosequi and the Lesser Plea, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1948); Comment, supra note 114, at 997.
116. R. MOLEY, supra note 115, at 150; cf. P. HowARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND
136-37 (1931) (circa 1930 Attorney General invoked nolle not more than six or seven
times a year).
117. R. MOLEY, supra note 115, at 151-52; Note, supra note 115, at 408.
118. R. MOLEY, supra note 115, at 151-52 (extreme decentralization of criminal justice
administration in the United States was conducive to proliferation of nolle).
119. Id. at 152-53; Williams, Discretion in Prosecuting, 3 CRIM. L. REv. 222, 226-27
(1956); Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted In-
action, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 210 & n.7 (1955).
120. R. MoLEy, supra note 115, at 153; see Note, supra note 115, at 408 (New York
legislature, reacting to widespread use and possible abuse, "early provided that the
prosecuting attorney could no longer nolle prosequi an indictment without permission of
the court").
121. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509 n.12, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 971 (1976) (before adoption of Rule 48(a), state judicial decisions gave courts role
in "dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding by requiring an 'order' or 'leave' or 'con-
sent' of ceurt"); see, e.g., State v. Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 145, 90 N.W. 564, 569 (1902) ("more
modern rule" provides that "while the prosecutor may file with the court his reasons for
not filing an information in a criminal action, it is the province of the court to de-
termine . ..whether the case shall be prosecuted or dismissed"); Guinther v. City of
Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935) (nolle subject to judicial review).
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a), Notes (citing ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Com-
mentaries, at 895-97).
123. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp.
.483, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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implied that the rule was designed, at least in part, to preserve the
independence of the grand jury.
24
The Cox opinion construed Rule 48(a) in a manner inconsistent with
most other judicial interpretations. The court sought to limit the reach
of Rule 48(a) by restricting its coverage to the defendant alone.
1 25 It
did so by implying that, in order to make a successful motion under
Rule 48(a), the prosecutor need establish only that the dismissal was
not for the purpose of subjecting a defendant to harassment by charg-
ing, dismissing and recharging the defendant, without placing him in
jeopardy.
126
Such an interpretation has not found general acceptance. With one
possible exception, 27 courts have uniformly required more: the govern-
ment must show that it lacks sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecu-
tion'12  or that trial would be impossible. 2 Both of these grounds are
predicated on the notion that the wishes of the grand jury can be
frustrated only when changes in circumstances make prosecution
frivolous or infeasible.'" Recently, courts have begun to enunciate a
different criterion for dismissal that is also not limited to the protec-
tion of the defendant. Cases have held that motions under Rule 48(a)
will be granted only after the court has weighed prosecutorial concerns
against the "public interest."'' 1 Under this public interest standard,
124. See United States v. Biddings, 416 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (denying
government's motion under Rule 48(a) for dismissal of indictment based on court's con-
clusion that opposite result "would delegate to the prosecutor the right to decide between
conflicting evidence and make a mockery of the grand jury system"); United States v. Doe,
101 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Conn. 1951) ("[T]he court may not properly approve a dismissal
of the entire case against any given defendant unless satisfied that the government lacks
sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution. Especially is this so where the matter is
before the court on indictment [by grand jury] as distinguished from information.")
125. 342 F.2d at 183 n.6 (Brown, J., concurring) ("The Court seems to be in virtual
agreement that this rule is for the protection of the defendant alone.") The Cox court's
narrow understanding of Rule 48(a) may have stemmed, at least in part, from its limited
conception of the grand jury as a mere screening mechanism.
126. Id. at 171.
127. Woodring v. United States, 311 F.2d 417 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913
(1963), was cited by the Cox opinion as controlling authority. 342 F.2d at 171. It should
be noted, however, that, in the factual context of the case, the Woodring court had to
construe Rule 48(a) in terms of harassment and double jeopardy. There was no need for it
to discuss the possible broader reaches of Rule 48(a).
128. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp.
483, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Shanahan, 168 F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D. Ind.
1958); United States v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Conn. 1951).
129. See United States v. Bettinger Corp., 54 F.R.D. 40, 41 (D. Mass. 1971) (possible
grounds for dismissal include death of defendant, incurable insanity or incompetency,
serious and incurable physical disease or disability, and defendant's fugitive status).
130. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp.
483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
131. See, e.g., In re Washington, 531 F.2d 1297, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds sub noin. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (purpose of Rule 48(a) was
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which more liberally accommodates the needs of the prosecution, the
courts have been sensitive to the policy concerns of the executive in
such key areas as plea bargaining 132 and national security.'"'
These strictures placed on resort to Rule 48(a) indicate an attempt
to maintain a balance between the grand jury and the prosecutor. Al-
though it is recognized that the prosecutor must have a broad preroga-
tive to exercise policy judgments concerning the merits of prosecution,
the grand jury cannot be disregarded at will. 134
It is clear, then, that the Cox holding, in its willingness to give the
executive free rein to ignore the grand jury, runs counter to the policy
of respect implicit in Rule 48(a). There are, however, additional reasons
why Cox should be overturned. Not only does its spirit contravene
the Rule 48(a) limitations, but its endowment of the prosecutor's
signature with substantive impact is inconsistent with precedent, legis-
lative history, and sound public policy.135 If, as Cox holds, the
validity of an indictment is dependent upon executive concurrence
protection of both defendant and public interest in fair administration of criminal justice;
issue was whether prosecution's motion to dismiss was "clearly contrary to 'manifest public
interest' "); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 511 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
971 (1976) (Rule 48(a) vests in the courts "the power and the duty to exercise a discretion
for the protection of the public interest"); United States v. Biddings, 416 F. Supp. 673, 675
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (prosecutor's decision to terminate pending criminal prosecution will be
"judicially disturbed" where " 'clearly contrary to manifest public interest' "). See gen.
erally 45 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 260, 266-67 (1977) (discussion of various Rule 48(a)
standards).
132. See United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (decision to
plea bargain presumptively executive, but under Rule 48(a), trial court not intended to
serve merely as "rubber stamp" for prosecutor's "conclusory" statements).
133. See United States v. Bettinger Corp., 54 F.R.D. 40, 41 (D. Mass. 1971) (grounds for
dismissal under Rule 48(a) include protection of government security against possible trial
disclosures).
134. In practice, it is unclear how or whether the government can be compelled to
proceed in the event that its motion to dismiss is denied. Judge Weinfeld, in dictum, has
stated that the court could not issue mandamus to compel prosecution because such action
would violate the separation of powers. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear
Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This view was reiterated in
United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 511 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)
(dictum). The confusing history of the drafting of Rule 48(a) suggests a desire to give the
courts some way of enforcing refusals to dismiss under the rule. The Cowan court noted
that the preliminary drafts provided: "The Attorney General or the United States Attorney
may file a dismissal of the indictment or information with a statement of the reasons
therefor and the prosecution shall terminate." In the final version, the Supreme Court
deleted the phrase "with a statement of the reasons therefor" and substituted the phrase
"by leave of court." Id. at 510.
135. If Cox is overturned, then one of the circumstances permitting the issuance of
grand jury reports, see note 49 supra, would be obviated since grand juries would have the
power to force indictments.
Even if Cox were not overruled generally, the more limited claim that its holding
should not apply where executive corruption is at issue remains persuasive. In such cir-
cumstances, the public's compelling interest in accountability tips the balance against
executive concerns. See pp. 1699-1700 & 1703-04 supra.
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as embodied in the signature, then the effectiveness of the grand jury's
constitutional role as a check on executive corruption will be endan-
gered.
In sum, the special prosecutor bill provision empowering the special
prosecutor to sign indictments is constitutional, not because Congress
may confer on a non-executive official a prerogative vested in the
executive, but because the signature is irrelevant to an indictment's
validity; the grand jury is entitled to return indictments without execu-
tive approval. The signature has only ministerial significance. 136 Thus,
the proposed legislation, in providing that the special prosecutor sign
indictments, does not in any way encroach upon the executive; it
merely gives the special prosecutor a testimonial function in keeping
with his service to the grand jury.
IV. The Post-Indictment Stage
Analysis of the constitutional limits of the court-appointed special
prosecutor's power cannot end at the indictment stage: under the
proposed legislation, the duties of the special prosecutor would not
conclude with the signing of an indictment but would extend to
carrying a case beyond indictment, through trial to judgment.137 In
ascertaining whether the envisaged post-indictment responsibilities of
a court-appointed special prosecutor possess constitutional support, it
is important to avoid the error of excessive categorization. Thus far,
debate about the special prosecutor has rigidified into the issue of
whether either court or executive appointment is justified. Such dis-
cussion has been unsatisfactory because it has not recognized that the
interests of various concerned actors and institutions change at different
stages in the criminal process. When this more sensitive approach is
adopted, it becomes clear that, although a balancing of interests justi-
fies court appointment up through the return of a valid indictment,
once an indictment has been brought, the balance shifts in favor of
executive appointment.
The checks-and-balances principle of executive accountability can be
meaningful only insofar as investigations of alleged wrongdoing are
made and information reaches the public. In the pre-indictment stage,
there is the greatest danger of a self-serving cover-up by the executive
136. In light of the signature's ministerial significance, the court may order the
prosecutor to sign the indictment. Courts may compel the performance of ministerial acts.
See Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930).
137. The special prosecutor would be empowered to exercise the prosecutorial func-
tions of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. S.555, § 594(a)(10); see p.
1694 & note 18 supra.
1719
The Yale Law Journal
at the expense of an unsuspecting public. At that stage, the grand jury's
needs and the prosecutor's investigative obligations combine in favor
of court appointment. 3 Any executive interests that might exist
diminish in importance, for the executive may later move to dismiss
the indictment under Rule 48(a).139 Once the indictment has been
brought, the public's compelling interest in accountability has been
served: the executive can then be subjected to political control and
pressure.
Beyond indictment, there is a lessening of grand jury and prosecu-
torial investigative concerns and an increase in executive interests. The
standard of proof needed for successful prosecution is not that of
probable cause, but of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.140 Executive
interests hitherto protected by grand jury secrecy may now be disclosed
at trial to the detriment of the nation. In this different, post-indictment
world, the predominance of executive concerns shifts the balance in
favor of executive appointment of the special prosecutor.
Courts have agreed that the decision whether to go forward with
prosecution or move for dismissal under Rule 48(a) is an essentially
executive' 4' one, and that the policy considerations on which such a
judgment is based fall primarily within the expertise of the executive
branch.142 That these policy decisions are made by the executive, sub-
ject to review under Rule 48(a), is consistent with the system of checks
on power that underlies the Constitution; in theory at least the execu-
tive will be answerable to the people directly through the ballot box.143
The executive nature of the decision to stop or go forward with a
prosecution illustrates the constitutional infirmity of appointment of
the "post-indictment" special prosecutor by an entity other than the
138. See pp. 1699, 1702-04 supra.
139. See p. 1718 and notes 132-33 supra.
140. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
141. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976); cf. In re Washington, 544 F.2d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (presumption exists that
executive is best judge of when to terminate case, but can be rebutted by evidence of bad
faith).
142. See note 29 supra (executive nature of policy decisions); cf. Nader v. Saxbe, 497
F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court, in analyzing customary refusal of federal courts
to compel prosecution of individuals at instance of private persons, stated that decision not
to prosecute was "executive" in character in that it required the "balancing" of "permis-
sible" policy factors).
143. Cf. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, Ill (1948)
(executive decisions as to foreign policy are complex and should be undertaken "only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil"); Bickel,
supra note 28, at 24 (prosecutor has "great opportunities to make discretionary decisions
which in our present system are ultimately subject to political control").
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executive. 144 The special prosecutor-who in effect would not be ac-
countable to anyone-would be charged with making post-indictment
prosecutorial decisions that courts have recognized as executive in
character. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine scenarios in which
the special prosecutor would be forced to make decisions involving
national security145 or the relative merits of prosecutions. 146 The
proposed special prosecutor law is thus unconstitutional insofar as it
empowers a non-executive official to make such post-indictment deci-
sions. The bill remains constitutional, however, to the extent that it
empowers the judiciary to appoint special prosecutors who would serve
the grand jury through the point at which the indictment is brought.
147
Conclusion
The unconstitutionality of the post-indictment court-appointed
special prosecutor does not vitiate the value of the special prosecutor
bill. Those aspects of the bill that survive can still effectively serve the
desired goal of exposing crimes. If the special prosecutor grand jury
144. Cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) ("executive functions"
include enforcement of laws and appointment of agents charged with duty of such en-
forcement).
145. Conceivably, the special prosecutor would have to determine whether to prosecute
high government officials and risk disclosure of national security secrets at trial. Cf. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 1, 1977, at 25, col. I (President and Justice Department allegedly weighed
considerations of national security and justice in deciding not to prosecute Richard Helms,
former Director of CIA).
146. Cf. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1976) (plea bargaining arrangement balanced importance of potential Texas and Water-
gate-related prosecutions).
147. See S. 555, § 594(a)(I), (9) (special prosecutor empowered to assist grand jury in
conduct of investigations and other proceedings, and to frame and sign indictments).
It might be argued that a scheme could be devised that would both permit the
special prosecutor to continue past the indictment stage and also protect the interests of
the executive. Under such a scheme, the court would invite the Attorney General at a
pre-trial conference to submit arguments as to why the indictment should be dismissed
under Rule 48(a). If the Attorney General (lid not submit arguments, the special prosecutor
would automatically continue through the remainder of the criminal process. If the At-
torney General accepted the court's invitation, the court could then either dismiss the
indictment, or reject the claims of the executive and permit the special prosecutor to con-
tinue through trial to judgment. There are two essential weaknesses with such a scheme.
First, the special prosecutor's discretionary decisions at trial, contrary to the constitutional
plan, would remain unaccountable. Cf. Bickel, supra note 28, at 24 (it is not difficult to
imagine dangers, if during McCarthy era, independent special prosecutor, impervious to
political control and to changes in political climate, had been appointed to "root out
subversies"). Second, the proposed procedure would not adequately protect the legitimate
interests of the executive at the trial stage. The uncertainties of trial often make it difficult
to predict the witnesses who will be called, the kinds of questions that may be asked, and
the information that may be disclosed. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 109 (1970)
(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (great uncertainties and "guesswork"
exist before trial).
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brings an indictment, the Justice Department, upon regaining control
of the proceedings, can refuse to proceed only by making a motion
under Rule 48(a), which gives the court a measure of control over
dismissal of the indictment. -This scheme, especially when viewed in
conjunction with the Attorney General's role in requesting court ap-
pointment of the special prosecutor, seems in theory to be an acceptable
balance between the goal of preserving the most crucial aspects of
executive control and that of forcing public recognition of, and affirma-
tive action against, alleged crimes by executive officials.' 48
148. On the various problems of implementation raised by the special prosecutor
legislation, see note 19 supra.
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